

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-10

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S E C R E T USNATO 3038

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: VERIFICATION

REF: A. MBFR VIENNA 240

B. STATE 109061

C. BONN 8395

D. USNATO 6636 DTG 291150Z NOV 74

E. USNATO 6708 DTG 031245Z NOV 75

F. USNATO 6526 DTG 222140Z NOV 74

1. MISSION AGREES WITH VIENNA (REF A) ON THE NEED FOR U.S. TO INTRO-
DUCE SOON IN SPC A PROPOSAL FOR ALLIED POSITION ON NEGOTIATED VERIFI-
CATION. WE FURTHER AGREE WITH VIENNA ON DESIRABILITY OF CLEARING OUR
PROPOSAL WITH FRG PRIOR TO ITS INTRODUCTION HERE. VERIFICATION IS AN
ISSUE OF BASIC POLITICAL IMPORTANCE TO FRG, WHICH WILL DIG IN HARD
IN NATO, AS IT HAS BEFORE, AGAINST ANY ASPECT OF U.S. VERIFICATION
PROPOSAL IT CONSIDERS UNACCEPTABLE

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2. WE CONSIDER SUGGESTED TEXT IN REF A TO BE GOOD. THE MAIN
OBSERVATIONS WE WOULD MAKE CONCERN PARAS 7 D AND E.

3. PARA 7 D IS IN ACCORD WITH WASHINGTON VIEW IN PARA 4 C, REF B,

ON CONTINUATION OF INSPECTION POSTS IN POST-REDUCTION PERIOD TO MONITOR MOVEMENT OF U.S. AND SOVIET FORCES INTO AND OUT OF NGA. HOWEVER, IT IS NOT CLEAR FROM PARAS 1(B) AND 2 AND 3, REF C, THAT BONN WILL ACCEPT THIS. WE ASSUME THIS SPECIFIC POINT WILL BE SUBJECT OF FURTHER U.S. - FRG CONSULTATIONS.

4. PARA 7E, UNLESS FURTHER QUALIFIED, COULD BE READ AS A PROPOSAL FOR POST-WITHDRAWAL, MOBILE TEAM INSPECTION, FAR FROM THE AGREED ENTRY/EXIT POINTS, LIMITED ONLY IN FREQUENCY. THIS DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE VIENNA'S INTENTION IN PARA 3, REF A; OR IN THE U.S. APPROACH TO THE FRG (REF B), WHICH STRESSED THAT POST-WITHDRAWAL CHANCES OF FRG AGREEMENT ON PRESENCE OF POST-WITHDRAWAL OBSERVERS WOULD SEEM TO DEPEND ON LIMITING THE SCOPE OF THEIR ACTIVITIES. WE DO NOT BELIEVE FRG WOULD AGREE TO LEAVE THIS ISSUE UNRESOLVED.

5. VIENNA HAS SUGGESTED THAT ANY NEW ALLIED POSITION ON VERIFICATION BE ADVANCED TO EAST AS AN ADDITION TO WESTERN REQUIREMENT FOR NON-INTERFERENCE WITH NTM (PARA 7 OF TEXT IN REF A). WE WOULD SUGGEST THAT A NEW ALLIED POSITION BE ADVANCED, NOT ONLY AS AN ADDITION TO THAT REQUIREMENT, BUT ALSO AS AN ADDITION TO THE REQUIREMENT FOR NON-INTERFERENCE WITH NEGOTIATED OBSERVERS (NAC GUIDANCE IN REFS D AND E). LATTER GUIDANCE WAS THE ONLY PART OF U.S. PROPOSAL OF LAST NOVEMBER OF FRAMEWORK FOR VERIFICATION WHICH FRG WAS ABLE TO ACCEPT.

6. MISSION WOULD EXPECT THAT IF FRG AGREED TO A VERIFICATION POSITION ALONG LINES OF REFS A AND B, THE OTHER ALLIES WOULD AS WELL.

7. NETHERLANDS, BELGIUM, UK AND CANADA HAVE ALL IN THE PAST SUPPORTED SUBSTANTIAL MOBILE TEAM INSPECTION, FOR BOTH TECHNICAL AND POLITICAL REASONS. NETHERLANDS AND BELGIUM HAVE BEEN PARTICULARLY VOCAL ON THIS POINT BOTH IN SPC AND IN MBFR WORKING GROUP. NETHERLANDS REP, DURING SPC DEBATE ON VERIFICATION LAST NOVEMBER, EVEN STRESSED THAT TO THE HAGUE VERIFICATIONS WAS AS IMPORTANT AS REDUCTIONS (REF F). NETHERLANDS AND BELGIUM, AS SMALL ALLIES LOCATED WITHIN NGA, APPEAR TO HAVE PARTICULAR INTEREST
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IN NEGOTIATED INSPECTION IN ORDER TO ASSURE THEIR OWN PARTICIPATION IN MBFR VERIFICATION.

8. HOWEVER, UK AND CANADA, DURING LAST SPC DEBATE AND IN WG HAVE ADOPTED INCREASINGLY RELAXED ATTITUDE, AND HAVE SOUGHT NOT TO PRESS FRG. WE WOULD ESTIMATE GOOD CHANCE THAT UK AND CANADA WOULD SUPPORT A VERIFICATION POSITION ALONG LINES OF REFS A AND B, IF FRG DOES. IN THAT EVENT, WE DOUBT NETHERLANDS AND BELGIUM WOULD HOLD OUT AGAINST OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, ALTHOUGH, IF THEY AGREED TO APPROACH IN REFS A AND B, THEY WOULD PROBABLY WANT TO MAKE CLEAR THAT IT SET NO PRECEDENT FOR PHASE II VERIFICATION.
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